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DispUTiNQ ThE WRECkAQE: IdEOloqiCAl
STRUqqlE AT t He ViETIMAM VETERANS
M em o ria l
H a r r y W . H aines

Even before its construction, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
(“The W a ll') achieved public and critical attention. Magazines,
newspapers and television reports gave wide currency to Maya Lin's
winning design, producing a mass mediated aura for the Memorial
before it took shape on the Washington Mall. These early reports, and
the Memorial itself, helped initiate what political elites had long avoided:
an ideological struggle over the meaning of the Vietnam War, the
symbolic political function of Vietnam veterans, and most significantly,
the rationale for American deaths. This ideological struggle continues
to unfold at The Wall, a ritual site where pilgrims enact complex
relationships with casualties and history. The Wall now functions as a
potent and politically volatile sign of the citizen's relationship to others
and to the state1and does not, as Griswold2argues, “separate war and
politics'. On the contrary, the Memorial provides a locus of ideological
struggle, revealing the political nature of the current rejntegrative
phase of Vietnam's "social d ra m a '3 as various ideological blocs
struggle to assign meaning to the war, Vietnam veterans and the
dead.

BREAkiNq t He S U ence
The Wall helped initiate a reintegrative — or healing — process
in the aftermath of what Fox Butterfield4 describes as “a trance of
collective amnesia,' during which the war was officially “forgotten' by
political elites and Vietnam veterans were effectively removed from
public discourse. The “trance' (an example of the productive capacity
of hegemony) served the interests of political power by avoiding a
potentially damaging analysis of the structural relationships and
assumptions5 which produced the war as “an ersatz conflict, invented
for protecting artificially conceived vital interests'6. Additionally, the
"tra nc e ' provided time for the regrouping of political interests in the
immediate aftermath of an ideological crisis. Historian Marilyn Young7
observed:
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The fundamental Institutions which gave rise to the Vietnam
war have hardly changed; what has changed is the credibility
o f the Imperialist Ideology which justified that war. From the
viewpoint of the State, that Is the wound that must be healed.

Serving as the anomaly in the reassertion of structural credibility, the
Vietnam veteran was simply silenced; a profoundly tragic process
which David Rabe8 predicted in his politically controversial play. Sticks
and Bones. The absence of a strong political consensus (shattered by
the w ar's ideological crisis) positioned the veteran as a potentially
volatile sign of a failed strategy, what Gibson9 calls “mechanistic
anticommunism'. The process of hegemony silenced the veteran by
providing no position from which to speak about the war. This process
is revealed in mass mediated representations of the veteran as either
a victim or psychotic, two variations on the theme of repression10, and
is strengthened by its indictment of the antiwar movement as the
source of the veteran's discontent.
The Wall, in effect, broke the silence of the immediate postwar
years, returned the veteran to discourse and initiated the ideological
struggle which now characterizes the reintegrative phase. Televised
rituals introduced the Memorial and alsofocused on how veterans and
others used it to enact their sense of loss. These widely disseminated
rituals forced political elites to verbally recognize Vietnam veterans for
the first time since the end of the war and spawned several
“homecoming parades' which Michael Clark11has called examples of
“historical surrealism'. The Wall produced Vietnam veterans and the
war dead as objects of ideological struggle, reflected in subsequent
mass media representations, including Rambo, Platoon, and various
television programs such as Magnum, P.I.; The A-Team; Tour o f Duty;
China Beach; and Vietnam War Story. Significantly, the veteran's
return to discourse occurs during a revisionist period, and the process
of hegemony — no longer able to silence veterans — adjusts to the
new conditions by developing therapeutic and disciplinary strategies.
Nowhere are these strategies more evident than at The Wall.

DispiJTiNq TtlE WRECkAqE
Sensingthe potential cooptation of their lived social experience,
the antiwar Vietnam veterans argued against anyattempt to represent
the dead in the form of public architecture. Marine combat veteran
W.D. Ehrhart's12 poem, “The Invasion of Grenada,' expresses an
oppositional view:
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I didn't want a monument
not even one as sober as that
vast black wall o f broken lives.
I didn't want a postage stamp.
I didn't want a road beside the Delaware
River with a sign proclaiming:
’ Vietnam Veterans Memorial Highway.'
W hat I wanted was a simple recognition
o f the limits o f our power as a nation
to Inflict our will on others.
W hat I wanted was an understanding
that the world Is neither black-and-white
nor ours.
W hat I wanted
was an end to monuments.

Ehrhart implies "an understanding' which recognizes Vietnam's social
reality, the very thing which US war managers attempted to obliterate
by the deployment of technology and rapid modernization13 and
which hegemony attempts to further marginalize by means of historical
revisionism14. Thomas Roberts15, an activist in the soldiers' antiwar
movement, suggested alterations to what he expected would be the
"typical' war memorial: "Defy the typical motif by situating the slab
sunken, sucking air for meaning.' Roberts envisioned an archlight
beaming across the Mall, illuminating a monumental crater, "the ashes
of 50,000 John D o e s... scattered to the bottom.'
Ehrhart and Roberts responded bitterly to what they saw as the
predictable cooptation of the war dead. They understood intuitively
what Waiter Benjamin14 concluded in the 1930s: "Even the dead will
not be safe from the enemy if he wins.' And they were right to fear the
cooptation of the Vietnam experience by political interests determined
to use veterans and casualties to justify future interventions. But the
ideological struggle centered at The Wall developed in unexpected
and unpredictable ways, and this struggle is worthy of examination.
Since its construction in 1982, The Wall has quickly developed
as a popular attraction in a city accurately described as a “tourist
district'. Elaborate sightseeing rituals are evident, and the Memorial
demonstrates what MacCannell17 identifies as several phases in a
process of "sight sacralization,' in which attributes formerly reserved for
holy places are ascribed to tourist attractions in the modem world. The
ideological struggle to assign meaning to the Vietnam War emerges at
the Memorial in what MacCannell identifies as the “naming' phase18.
Naming activities include public speeches, other administrative
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messages and various news accounts functioning to define the
Memorial and to thereby define the war and veterans. For example.
President Jimmy Carter signed the Memorial's construction authorization
with these words:
A long and painful process has brought us to this moment
today. Our nation, as you all know, was divided by this war.
For too long we tried to put thatdlvlslon behind usby forgetting
the Vietnam war and. In the process, we Ignored those who
bravely answered their Nation's call, adding to their pain the
additional burden of our Nation's own Inner conflict” .

Clearly, the Memorial is to be a sign signifying both a sense of loss forthe
dead and a sense of reincorporation of the survivors. It is the sign of
community refound, as if the Nation is coming to its senses following an
incomprehensible lapse in memory (the trance of collective amnesia).
Carter locates the Vietnam veteran as a carrier of a special “burden,"
a unique repository of America's war-related contradictions. He
names the Memorial as a sign of national expiation, a sign through
which Vietnam veterans are purged of an unidentified “inner conflict".
Hegemony's therapeutic strategy unfolds even before the
groundbreaking.
The Memorial, veterans, and by implication, the war itself are
furtherpsychologized in the naming phase. The idea for a Vietnam War
memorial originated as the response of one veteran to a mediated
version of the war, the feature film The Deerhunter. Former infantryman
Jan C. Scruggs, tormented by flashbacks after seeing the film, formed
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund in April, 197920. He was joined by
several volunteers, many of them wives and mothers of soldiers killed in
the war. By January 1980, Congress authorized the memorial, and all
one hundred Senators co-sponsored the bill. The Fund announced a
juried competition for memorial designs in October 1980. Texas
millionaire H. Ross Perot provided seed money for the competition.
Submitted designs were required to list the names of all the dead and
missing Americans and to demonstrate sensitivity for the site, close to
the Washington Monument and Lincoln Memoria21!. Thq_se!ection
criteria required that the design be apolitical in the sense of expressing-"
no specific position on the correctness of the war.
From among 1,421 entries (the largest design competition in
the United States or Europe), a jury of eight prominent architects and
sculptors selected the design of 22-year-old Maya Lin, an undergraduate
student of architecture at Vale University. The Lin design was selected
in May 1981, and approved by the National Capitol Planning
Commission, the Fine Arts Commission and the Department of the
Interior. In October 1981, a bitter opposition emerged; a significant
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development in the naming phase. Wounded Vietnam veteran Tom
Carhart, now a civilian lawyer at the Pentagon, called the design ’ a
black gash of shame and sorrow,' and asked the Fine Arts Commission:
Are we to honor our dead and our sacrifices to America with
a black hole?... Can America truly mean that we should feel
honored by a black pit? In a city filled with white monuments,
this is our reward for faithful service22.

Although Carhart's own proposed design (a representational
figure of an army officer holding the body of a dead infantryman to the
sky) had been rejected, his opposition to Lin's design was apparently
based on criteria of stylistic ’ normalcy'. For him, Lin's design was
symptomatic of the disorder. Where the Commission saw ’dignity',
’ nobility', and ’ serenity', Carhart saw ’shame and sorrow ', the
veterans' burden all along. He was joined by author James Webb, a
decorated Marine Combat veteran who later served as Secretary of
the Navy, and Assistant Secretary of Defense. Webb called Lin's design
a ’wailing w a ll'23. Perot also opposed the selected design and
opposition grew when the Chicago Tribune called it ’ a monumental
insult to veterans'. Those agreeing with Carhart and Webb wanted the
Memorial to be white and above ground, similar to other monuments
in Washington, DC.
Congressional opposition gathered, and Interior Secretary
James Watt withdrew his support in January 1981, six weeks before
groundbreaking. Scruggs then drew upon support from national
veterans' groups and influential military leaders to fight the opposition.
Secretary Watt, named by Congress to oversee the design process,
ordered Scruggs to seek a compromise. Throughout January and
February 1981, conflicting sides argued and finally agreed to a
compromise design which included a flagpole and a representational
statue by Frederick Hart. Despite the acrimony of the early naming
phase, the actual ceremony marking off the Memorial was
characterized by these selected statements:
Army Chaplain Max D. Sullivan: ‘ May this place be a holy
place of healing.'
National Commander of the American Legion Jack W. Flint:
’ The suffering and the loneliness (the veterans) bore when
they returned home... are finally a t an end. The frustration and
confusion of the American people, long willing but unable to
express their gratitude and appreciation to a generation of
unselfish patriots. Is finally a t an end.'
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Executive Director o f the Veterans of Foreign Wars Cooper T.
Holt: '(the Memorial will help) create an accord out of our
bitterest military experience since the Civil W ar.'
Virginia Governor Charles S. Robb (President Johnson's sonin-law and Marine combat officer In Vietnam): * I w asn't able
to answer 'why' (when writing to the families o f men killed
under his command), and this memorial doesn 7 attem pt to
say why b u t It does say we cared and we remembered. 'M
Jan C. Scruggs: "The American people were divided by the
war... but one point that all Americans can agree upon is that
Vietnam veterans deserve recognition and appreciation for
their sacrifices. Let this memorial begin the healing process
and forever stand as a symbol of national unity.'25

The Memorial is named a therapeutic place of healing and
accord, an expression of gratitude and national unity, a unique
physical location where consensus emerges, where suffering, loneliness,
frustration and confusion are purged. The trance of collective amnesia
is broken in 1981, as America “remembers'. But it is a specific kind of
remembering, identified by Governor Robb. The memory istherapeutic
and not his+oric. The most important question Robb pondered mile
writing to the survivors of dead Marines remains unanswered even as
consensus is attained.
Since its introduction in 1982, the Memorial has quickly
developed as the focal point of the national memory of Vietnam. This
memory is produced as the product of ideological struggle and takes
material form in the broad range of activities which now occur at the
site. The Memorial's ambiguous stance generates a shifting symbolic
ground, a fluctuating, constantly renegotiated field in which visitors
enact the meaning of the Vietnam War. Based on his ethnographic
observations at the Memorial site, Ehrenhaus26 categorizes the visitors
according to three types of behavior and how these behaviors embody
particular types of social meaning.
Mourne.scome “insecularpilgrimage'.oftentoleave "artifacts
ofcommemoration' atthesite. The mourners include Vietnam veterans
who treat the Memorial as “sacred ground'. Meaning arises from the
personal truths of remembrance in the liminal encounter of the living
and the dead27.
Searchers have no personal relationships with the names on
The Wall: they search for ways of participating as broadly as possible
in discovering the Memorial's m eanings', and “they use mourners and
their artifacts as focusing lenses'. For searchers, meaning arises in part
from memory, but mainly from the chance and momentary encounters
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with mourners and artifacts of the Memorial's social world.
Volunteerswere initially mourners or searchers, and have made
a commitment to the Memorial as a place of ’ genuine experience'.
They serve as caretakers who help visitors and who watch over
veterans overwhelmed by their encounters28.
As Ehrenhaus' observations suggest, these three groups
constitute an ever changing social and political context for the
Memorial. Their ritualized behaviors help keepthe Memorial's meaning
open and resistant to closure and ideological containment. Their
presence maintains an organic quality in the ideological struggle over
the war's meaning. Foss29 attempts to explain the extraordinary
popularsuccess of the Memorial byfocusing on the design'sideological
ambiguity, a product of the design criteria. Because ’ no one meaning
emerges from the memorial', each visitor must Dring his or her own
meaning to bear upon the names in granite, and each must see his or
her own reflection — the self — among the dead, and this helps explain
the development of the Memorial as a site of pilgrimage. The Wall's
ideological ambiguity acknowledges what Scarry30calls ’the referential
instability of the hurt body'. In her analysis of ’the structure of w a r'.
Scarry focuses attention on the phrases: ’to kill for his country' and ’to
die for his country', the universal ideological declarations in warfare.
The killing and dying constitute ’ a deconstruction of the state as it
ordinarily manifests itself in the body'31, requiring ’the appended
assertion (either verbalized or materialized as in the uniform), 'for my
country". The Wall avoids the ’appended assertion* and assigns no
heroic motivation whatever to the injured bodies recounted in the
names, but otherwise significant by their absence. Only individual
names accumulate as war's wreckage, prompting the NcrtionalReview
to complain: ’The mode of listing the names makes them individual
deaths, not deaths in a cause; they might have been traffic accidents.'
But the list of names makes it possible for the Memorial to
simultaneously comfort the visitor while evoking an interpretation of
profound loss. As a sign of the injured body, the Memorial's names and
how pilgrims acknowledge them work against the political cooptation
Ehrhart and Roberts feared. The injured body, represented by the
individual name, develops as the sign of the deconstructed nation,
and this sign is enacted in the ritual of touching The Wall. By touching
an individual name, the pilgrim acknowledges the injured soldier's
absence from social relationships, locating Vietnam ’as an experiential
and historical fact in the lives of... fam ilies'32 and in other social
networks extending across time. Pilgrims further acknowledge the
injured body by leaving artifacts proclaiming the individual
characteristics of lost soldiers, placing the loss within specific social
settings.
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Each name locates the meaning of war in the lived, individual
experience of a specific casualty, whose absence from social discourse
extends the meaning of war to the community. Each name is a sign of
an injured body, a life lost at a specific moment in time. Because the
names are listed chronologically, and not alphabetically, the reader
must search for a specific name according to the specific moment of
loss. Occasionally, an alphabetical arrangement breaks the precise
pattern of representation, and "we know that here were the men of a
single platoon, wiped out together in a single engagement'33. Instead
of serving as a sign of the structure of war. the injured body signifies
what Gilligan34 calls the ’structure of interconnection*.
Foss35 reports that “supporter and protester of the war alike'
often respond to The Wall with the term "eloquent'. But this eloquence,
this ambiguity, opens the Memorial to ideological struggle and makes
it potentially susceptible to the hegemonic process now evident at the
site (as well as in other cultural forms, including mass media
representations of the war). More than any recent example of public
architecture, the Memorial provides a concrete instance — a perfect
model in material form — of Stuart Hall's36 observation that "no
guarantees' exist in ideological struggle. The design's ambiguity
makes it peculiarly open-ended as an object of struggle, suggested by
its widespread use by a variety of political factions as a symbol of the
war's meaning. By claiming The Wall, conflicting groups claim the
memory — the "lessons^ — of Vietnam for their various agendas. The
meaning of the Memorial remains open. The hegemonic process has
not yet fully coopted it. but not for want of trying.

ThERApy ANd DiscipliNE
Hegemony attempts to coopt the Memorial by therapeutic
means, demonstrated by Veterans Day ceremonies in 1984 and 1988
which administratively normalized the Vietnam veteran. At the 1984
ceremony, President Ronald Reagan officially accepted the Memorial
on behalf of the nation. The acceptance came a few days after the
unveiling of Frederick Hart's representational addition to The Wall and
climaxed a week-long series of events called Salute 2. a sequel to the
1982 National Salute to Vietnam Veterans in which 150,000 veterans
marched through Washington forthe televised opening of The Wall. In
newspapercoverage,Sa/ufe2organizersstressedthetheme "American
Veterans — One and AH', a conscious appeal to integrate younger
Vietnam veterans with older veterans of earlier, more successful wars.
This model of transgenerational positioning would take subsequent
form in film and television representations of the Vietnam veteran
within the conventions of World War 2 combat films, thereby
decontextualizing the Vietnam War by removing it — and Vietnam

Disputing the Wreckage
veterans — from specific historical circumstances.
reporter explained that Salute 2
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One newswire

was billed as part of a 'healing process' for those veterans,
many o f whom relumed from Southeast Asia to be spat a t by
anti-war protesters as 'baby killers' and by veterans of
America's victorious wars as 'losers'37.

Administrative power offers a therapeutic position for Vietnam veterans,
“hailing'38them as World War 2 heroes and demonstrating hegemony's
ability to smooth over ideological contradictions, to make them seem
natural and right, or what Hall39 calls “’good sense,' which — leaving
science to one side — is usually quite enough for ideology*. In Salute
2. acknowledgement of the Memorial is intended as reintegration of
the Vietnam veteran, as well as identification of the veteran's “burden*,
left unspecified by President Carter four years earlier. The theme of
healing and reintegration is stressed throughout the newspaper reports
of the ceremonies and emerges as the central administrative message
in President Reagan's 11 November 1984 speech of formal acceptance,
quoted in detail by New York Times reporter Ben A. Franklin40:
'This memorial Is a symbol of both past and current sacrifice,'
Mr. Reagan said.... 'Th e war In Vietnam threatened to tear
our society apart, and the political and philosophical
disagreements that separated each side continue, to some
extent,' he said. 'It's been said that these memorials reflect
a hunger for healing.
‘Loyalty and Valor' Praised
* I do not know If perfect healing ever occurs... but I know that
in one sense when a bone Is broken and It Is knit together well,
it will In the end be stronger than as If It had not been broken.
I hope that before my days as Commander and Chief are
ended, the process will be completed.'
'L e t me say this to Vietnam veterans gathered here today,'
Mr. Reagan said, 'W hen you retuned home, you brought
solace to the loved ones of those who suffered the scars.... But
there has been a rethinking there, too. Now we can say to
you, and say as a nation, thank you for your courage."
'There has been much rethinking by those who did not serve,
and those who did.... There has been much rethinking by
those who had strong opinions on the war, and by those who
did not know which view was right. There's been rethinking on
all sides, and this Is good. And it's time we moved on. In unity
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and with resolve, with the resolve to always stand for freedom,
as those who fought did, and to always try to protect and
preserve the peace.'

Hegemony produces a new position for the veteran, who is
"subjected, used, transformed and improved'41 by therapeutic and
disciplinary means. The Memorial symbolizes "both past and current
sacrifices', linking the Vietnam Warto a continuing vigilance necessary
to “protect and preserve the peace*. The cost is great but it is
nevertheless a normal condition in which Vietnam is a specific example
of a general type. Vietnam veterans are “those who fought*, those
who stood “forfreedom*, as Americans have always stood f orfreedom
— and still do. The Vietnam War is normalized in terms consistent with
American political ideology, the deaths are made rational, and the
veterans are whole once again, stronger for their expiated burden.
The message identifies the veterans' burden as “little solace,*
the lack of compassion and acceptance given to combat veterans by
their countrymen once the war was lost. The lack of solace is further
specified as a characteristic of Americans “unable to distinguish
between* a generalized abhorrence for war and “the stainless
patriotism* of Vietnam veterans. The contradictions of the veterans'
firsthand experience42, the war's “counterfeit universe*43are explained
as ‘ philosophical disagreements* in the process of resolution. Where
disagreement existed, a consensus is manufactured which attemptsto
integrate the Vietnam veteran with other veterans and to normalize
the Vietnam War in terms of other wars. For the veteran, the price of
reintegration is the revision of memory to coincide with hegemony's
newly produced consensus. Many veterans are willing to accept these
terms, a measure of their postwar isolation. Hegemony structures “the
field of other possible actions'44open to some veterans, who bring their
interpretation of Vietnam in line with prevailing interpretations, enabling
a therapeutic function of the Memorial. In this way, Vietnam veterans
may become what Hall45calls ‘fully paid-up members of the consensus
club*, the sign of the reintegrated society.

V e te r a n s D ay 1988
The 1988 Veterans Day ceremonies at The Wall, televised by the
C-SPAN cable network, served several political interests. It provided an
opportunity forthe American Legion National Commander. HF “Sparky*
Gierke, to briefly mention the results of a study showing that ‘ almost
two-thirds of those who experienced heavy combat* in Vietnam
‘ reported delayed psychological and other health effects*46. Gierke
told the crowd of about 10,000 persons47: “The problems faced by
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these veterans are real. They are not self-inflicted. They are veterans
who need help but are not getting it from a country they served.'
Psychologically distressed veterans remain an ideological
anomaly in the hegemonic process whereby Vietnam veterans are
hailed as World War 2 heroes. Such veterans signify ideological crisis,
what Lewis48 identifies as a disconfirmation of meaning. Thev continue
to occupy a social role which inherently questions the credibility of the
policies which hegemony now reasserts. Their distress is politically
volatile. Significantly, Gierke insists that the problems are “not selfinflicted', implying a basis for the problems within the structure of the
war itself, but his comments are ignored by other speakers who share
a common objective: the production of Vietnam veterans and the
war dead as signs of ideological certainty — as signs of a reconstituted
consensus. For example, Virginia Senator-Elect Charles Robb reminded
the crowd that the 1984 ceremonies had consecrated the Memorial as
“a holy place', and he linked the reconciliation of veterans to the
broader concept of foreign policy49:
Perhaps In no other area Is the need so acute as In the area
o f foreign policy. We have to proceed on a bipartisan basis
for a course o f energetic engagement, a policy that vigorously
asserts America's Ideals and defends her interests abroad, a
policy that establishes our role as an Inspiration to oppressed
peoples everywhere.... And It must be a policy that neither
renounces nor relies exclusively on the use of force, a policy
tempered but not paralyzed by the lessons of Vietnam.

Robb'sfinal comments implied what “the lessons' might include.
He called for the nation to “stand for support of democracy ad human
rights and vigorous opposition to tyranny,' an agenda which “the
memory of our fallen brothers and sisters' in Vietnam is intended to
inspire. Hegemony again obscures the contradictions of American
involvement in Vietnam by decontextualizing the structural relationships
betweentheUSwarmanagersandtheSaigongovemment — structural
relationships in which corruption and tyranny were the norms?0. The
Vietnam War dead emerge as signs of political consensus for a
renewed policy of containment,the very policy which failed in Vietnam.
Other speakers developed the theme of reconciliation and
closure. The ceremonies occurred one month after Election Day, and
John Wheeler, Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund,
called for political unity. The ceremony also marked the approaching
end of the Reagan administration. Behind the speakers podium a
large banner read: “Vietnam Veterans Memorial Thank You Mr.
President!' Wheeler explained that Reagan had intervened in behalf
of the Memorial's construction when Secretary of the Interior Watt had
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moved to block it, and Wheeler added51:
President Reagan brought the Vietnam veterans home. He
brought us home In the sense o f according us respect and
opening the door so that we can continue to serve our
country.
In 1981, the separation between Vietnam veterans and our
country was a very deep wound. There had not been a
condition like that anywhere In our country's past. Now, eight
years later, there's been a remarkable reconciliation.

Here, Wheeler comments directly on the therapeutic nature of the
ideological process which began unfolding atthe Memorial and within
other cultural forms once the Vietnam veteran was returned to discourse.
Hegemony, in the form of administrative action, signals a new
acceptance and, for some, opportunities. For this, Wheeler thanked
the President, who called Vietnam veterans “gentle heroes' and
“champions of a noble cause'52:
I am not speaking provocatively here. Unlike the other wars
o f this century, o f course, there were deep divisions about the
wisdom and rightness of the Vietnam War. Both sides spoke
with honesty and fervor, and w hat more can we ask In our
democracy? After more than a decade of desperate boat
people, after the killing fields of Cambodia, after all that has
happened In that unhappy part o f the world, who can doubt
th a t the cause fo r wNch our men fought was ju s ft (Miles
added)
It was. a fte r all. however Im perfectly pursued, the cause o f
freedom. And theyshowed uncommon courage In Its service.
Perhaps at this late date we can all agree that we've learned
one lesson: tha t young Americans m ust never again be sent
to fight and die unless we are prepared to le t them win. (Italics
added)

The therapeutic strategy takes form as administrative expiation. As in
1984, veterans are reminded in 1988 that they fought for freedom in
Vietnam, but were not permitted to win the war. Here the strategy
relies directly upon what Kimball53 identifies as “the stab-in-tne-back
legend' which holds thatthe Vietnam Warwas “lost' by weak politicians,
civilian strategists, antiwar activists, news reporters and others and is
“founded on arch-conservative and militaristic assumptions and values'.
The strategy is especially powerful in its ability to ascribe an anti
veteran position to its critics, and this parallels stab-in-the-back
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arguments which equate "criticism of containment militarism with
disloyalty'54.
The ceremonies generated a photo opportunity which further
deployed the strategy throughout various media, including the front
pages of the 12 November 1988 issues of the New York Times. Los
Angeles Times, and the Washington Post. The photo provides an
instance of ideological condensation in which the productive power
of hegemony takes material form. The photo shows President and Mrs.
Reagan in the role of mourners at The Wall, identified in the following
captions:
The New York Times: President Reagan and his wife, Nancy,
at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Mr. Reagan said that
despite divisions over the war, 'who can doubt that the cause
for which our men fought was Just?'
Los Angeles Times: Nancy Reagan reaches out to the wall of
the Vietnam War (s/c) Memorial as she and the President pay
a Veterans Day visit.
The Washington Post: As the President looks on. First Lady
Nancy Reagan reaches out to touch wall of the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial.

The photo opportunity extends the process of ideological cooptation
into the rituals which produce the war's meaning. Hegemony claims
The Wall for the specific needs of a reasserted consensus implied in the
President's speech. The ideological struggle focused on The Wall
includes attempts to reassert a consensus which serves power in three
ways: it closes debate on the structure of American policy in Vietnam;
it provides a therapeutic and politically useful reintegration for veterans;
and it facilitates future military interventions based on an improved
and more fully rationalized Vietnam model.
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